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The Constitutionality of Indefinite Detainment
of United States Citizens as Terrorist Suspects
Spencer Kelly, Tiffany Erickson, and Eric Backman1

O

n April 27, 2010, Syed Fahad Hashmi appeared in federal
district court to accept a plea bargain. He pled guilty to
conspiracy to provide material support to Al Qaeda. Three
other charges which the federal government and filed against him
were dropped, and Hashmi was sentenced to 15 years in prison. This
ended Hashmi’s nearly four-year pretrial incarceration and he was
sent to a super maximum security prison in Colorado. However, the
weeks and months spent in anticipation of a criminal trial were filled
with demonstrations held, concerts performed, and letters written
in support of Hashmi and to raise awareness of what many saw as
inhumane conditions in which he was held. Hashmi was being held
under Special Administrative Measures, had spent nearly three years
in solitary confinement, and had gone five months without contact
from anyone other than his attorney.
Hashmi’s story has raised public discussion regarding conditions of pretrial confinement, particularly regarding potential terrorist suspects. Other suspected terrorists, including Jose Padilla and
Yaser Hamdi, have raised the visibility of the issue while giving
it new dimension. For many, the mere mention of detainment of
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terrorist suspects brings to mind Guantanamo Bay and similar holding facilities. As complicated and, at times, messy as policies regarding terrorist suspects can be, the three above-mentioned men add
a new wrinkle: they are American citizens. Their detainment and
prosecution must also account for the rights and privileges afforded
them by their citizenship. In recent years, the United States government has tightened security measures and passed tougher legislation
to combat the threat of further terrorism.
The implementation of this legislation with other legislation, particularly SAMs (as outlined below) is unnecessarily overstepping the
boundaries protecting the rights of American citizens—particularly
those outlined in the fifth and sixth amendments. The most glaring
violation is the disregard of habeas corpus. This legislation is riddled
with loopholes and ought to be amended to reduce the excessive infringement on the Constitutional rights of American citizens. We
contend that current legislation should be amended to impose a timeframe in which citizens deemed as terror suspects must be charged
in order to preserve their right of habeas corpus, and the conditions
under which they are held ought to be reexamined in order to meet
the standards guaranteed these suspects by the Constitution. Ultimately, government infringement on the rights of American citizens
held under suspicion of terror must be cut back where possible and
carefully monitored where necessary.
Section one of this paper will give a brief history of the relevant legislation concerning detaining terror suspects. In section two
of this paper, we explain the role of habeas corpus in the detention
of terror suspects, how the government can legally infringe on that
right, and how the government has overstepped their legal bounds
regarding habeas corpus. In section three, we outline other various
Constitutional rights that play a role in detaining suspected terrorists, how the government should uphold these rights, and how it has
potentially violated them. Finally, in section four, we outline ways
in which the government can cut back current policy to better protect Constitutional rights and better monitor detainment policy and
procedure in order to minimize or eliminate infringement while
still ensuring the safety of our nation. This section will propose
changes to current legislation as well as suggestions to better protect
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Constitutional rights under current detainment policy and law. Specific changes in legislation to better ensure the Constitutional rights
of suspected terrorists will be outlined, guided by principles of
change that are in line with our argument that more can and should
be done to protect the rights of detained terror suspects. Though the
balance between national security and individual rights can be difficult to maintain, we argue that changes should be made in order
to balance the scales that currently are tipped too far away from the
Constitutional rights of American citizens held under suspicion of
terrorism.

I. A History of Relevant Legislation
On May 17, 1996, the Code of Federal Regulations accepted new
anti-terrorism measures. These came about, in large part, because of
the recent domestic terrorist bombing attack in Oklahoma City just
two years prior, and the new code Prevention of Acts of Violence
and Terrorism in the Code of Federal Regulations (hereafter CFR)
fell in line with contemporary legislation. The key element to the
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism is the establishment
and implementation of Special Administrative Measures. A Special
Administrative Measure (hereafter SAM) is a restriction placed on
a prisoner’s housing and/or communication privileges. Specifically,
a SAM “may include housing the inmate in administrative detention
and/or limiting certain privileges, including, but not limited to, correspondence, visiting, interviews with representatives of the news
media, and use of the telephone.” This is done by the Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, in cases when such
measures are “reasonably necessary to protect persons against the
risk of death or serious bodily injury.” These measures are imposed
for up to 120 days, though with approval from the Attorney General
they can be extended for up to one year. However, they may be “extended thereafter by the Director, Bureau of Prisons, in increments
not to exceed one year,” and such extensions may be continued indefinitely.2
2

28 CFR §501.3
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The creation and use of SAMs has been both enabled and expanded by other pieces of legislation. On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was signed into effect. The
biggest effect of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(hereafter AEDPA) is the limitation in procedural and substantive
scope of writ of habeas corpus. Procedurally, AEDPA banned successive petitions for habeas corpus, requiring instead that all appeals
be put into one petition. Substantively, AEDPA limited the scope
of habeas corpus in that such petitions are granted only if convictions are made “contrary to…clearly established Federal law” or
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence”.3 This means that prisoners who wish to appeal for habeas
corpus pursuant to trial and conviction are given one chance to make
an appeal and are given a very limited scope in which to appeal.
Another piece of legislation that has greatly aided the implementation of SAMs is the Uniting and Strengthening by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
of 2001 (hereafter the Patriot Act). The Patriot Act provides terms
under which any individual believed to be “engaged in any…activity that endangers the national security of the United States” may
be detained indefinitely. This is under the terms that the individual,
once in custody, “may be detained for additional periods of up to
six months only if the release of the alien will threaten the national
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person.” 4 The combination of these measures allows for any individual suspected of terrorist activity or affiliation to be detained indefinitely in solitude.

II. The Role of Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus plays a crucial role in evaluating the constitutionality of indefinite detainment without formal charges. A writ of
habeas corpus is a procedural order that demands a prisoner’s detainment be evaluated by a judge, and possibly suspended, based
3
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on factual evidence and legality. The underlying principle of habeas
corpus is to protect detainees from being victimized by the executive
office’s whims, effectively acting as a judicial check on the executive. This privilege has existed in English law since the Magna Carta
in 12155 and was included in American law with the drafting of the
Constitution in 1787. Habeas corpus has a rich history of protecting
citizens from an unchecked executive branch, and it has evolved tremendously since the inclusion in 1787.
While filing a writ of habeas corpus may provide some protection for uncharged detainees, the government, with the help of the
courts, has so far preserved the right to deny release because the
legality of detainment of terrorist suspects has yet to be detailed.
Anti-terrorist legislation has provided loopholes for officials to detain suspects for up to a year without being formally charged, which
can be renewed indefinitely.
In regards to detention, habeas corpus is oftentimes a prisoner’s
most effective chance at being released, or even hearing the charges
against them, particularly in cases involving national security. Habeas corpus not only provides a judge with the opportunity to review
facts, but it can also provide a legal proceeding when there may not
have been a formal trial before detention by reviewing the process of
detainment, not merely the justification. If there had been no formal
charges and/or court proceedings, this writ may be necessary for
prisoners to receive any protection through the courts from executive detention. In essence, filing a writ of habeas corpus is a prisoner’s way to ensure that due process is followed, at least in the cases
involving American citizens6.
While the great writ may be a central component in detention trials, there is the Suspension Clause in the first article of the Constitution
that states, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
5
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Safety may require it”. Courts have refused to lend strong interpretation to this clause, which has left habeas corpus as a somewhat unavailable tool for wrongfully, or not so wrongfully, detained citizens.
The clause is what has provided a legal cushion for the detainment
of terrorist suspects by the executive branch. Up to this point, the
extent of habeas corpus as a guaranteed protection of rights has not
yet been determined, which provides the necessary loopholes that
have been used by the executive office to indefinitely detain American citizens under the broad interpretation of the Suspension Clause.
This clause not only means that some detentions may be appropriate, but that the opportunity of hearing charges and having a judge
review factual evidence for detention may be denied completely.
New anti-terrorism legislation, in partnership with the Suspension Clause, provides an opportunity for too broad of an interpretation of government’s power to detain American citizens. Currently
the Suspension Clause operates as a somewhat unsupported and
vague protection of a privilege, not a right—a procedural purpose
that has been untouched and unexpanded to the point necessary
for the protection of American citizens’ rights. While there may be
some cases in which detainment is necessary to protect the American public, there should be additional specific legislation detailing the appropriate occurrences for executive detention to provide
more protection and limit government invasion of rights, rather than
open-ended clauses and legislation that unlawfully expands executive power. The current need for habeas corpus in post-9/11 government has evolved from its purpose in 1787 during the drafting of
the Constitution, and the need has grown enough to require a more
definite detailing of the executive branch’s power in detaining terrorist suspects.
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The Supreme Court made some progress in defining and expanding the privilege of access to habeas corpus in the Boumidiene7 case
by ruling that those detained at Guantanamo Bay had the right to habeas corpus. Even having this right protected is crucial to upholding
and protecting the rights that the framers of the Constitution fought
so hard to keep. Indefinite detainment does not have to end, but prisoners should be able to request that a judge review the facts and the
legality of detention. Through the Hamdi case, the Supreme Court
ruled that habeas corpus might extend rights beyond the boundaries
of due process8. There have been some steps forward in defining and
allowing the privilege of habeas corpus, but there must be a greater
expansion and new legislation passed that will limit the executive
office’s ability to indefinitely detain “enemy combatants”.

III. Other Constitutional Factors
As mentioned in the introduction, this section will outline other
Constitutional rights which play a role in detaining suspected terrorists, how the government should uphold these rights, and how it has
potentially violated them. Specifically, this section will examine the
effect of SAMs on due process and how that relates to the cases of
suspected terrorists. This section will also briefly discuss the suspension clause and its role in the cases of detaining suspected terrorists.
The fifth amendment protects American citizens from discretionary detention: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a grand jury, […]nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
7
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request a judicial review of detainment. While this is not the exact same
procedure as filing a writ of habeas corpus, the two work similarly in
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due process of law9.” This last clause—the Due Process Clause—is
repeated elsewhere in the constitution, specifically in the fourteenth
amendment, which, along with repeating the Due Process Clause,
includes what came to be known as the Equal Protection Clause:
“nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws10.” The Supreme Court has determined that the Equal
Protection Clause extends to the Bill of Rights. In short, due process
of law is a constitutionally protected right in every jurisdiction in
this country. The right to a trial by jury is something owed to every
American citizen—including naturalized citizens, another protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment11. The cases of Syed
Fahad Hashmi, Jose Padilla, and others highlight the overstepping
which has taken place by the federal government of its own laws.
There is undoubtedly an argument to be made that SAMs, the
Patriot Act, and other related legislation and executive action form
an ugly but necessary part of national defense in the modern world.
Potential threats are greater, more numerous, and more insidious
than ever before. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the
needs and shortcomings of our national defense system, although
there is much to be said in defense of counterterrorist measures.
However, the case of Hashmi may prove particularly troublesome
for that argument. First of all, as a United States citizen his right to
due process is constitutionally protected—a right which has been
violated not so much by any error on the part of the judicial system,
but by executive action which sanctions the unlawful detention of
American citizens. Any such action taken by a legislative body or,
as in this case, by an executive branch, blurs the lines of checks and
balances, and provides a scenario in which American’s rights—let
alone human rights in general—can be systemically and repeatedly
violated. This is seen in the lack of due process given to Hashmi
and other citizens arrested on terror charges. Second, Hashmi’s

9

U.S. Const. amend. V.

10

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

11
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prosecution was never linked to any act of terrorism or violence12.
Hashmi did not have a history of violence nor of participation in
extremist religious organizations—he was a college student in New
York—and given that information, his detention seems much less
just than it did simply knowing that he plead guilty to conspiracy to
provide material support to Al Qaeda. Hashmi’s innocence (or lack
thereof) is not the central point of this paper. However, regardless of
whether or not Hashmi was truly guilty of conspiring to aid a terrorist organization, what has happened to him and others like him sheds
light on the injustice that laws such as SAMs can create.
Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, hundreds of suspected terrorists were detained. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the first of
a series of Supreme Court cases regarding detention of suspected
terrorists, the primary defense was the above-mentioned Due Process Clause. In a plurality decision from that case, the Court put
forth that one of the most important protections offered by the Due
Process Clause is “the interest in being free from physical detention
by one’s own government13.” The Court has also extended the reach
of the Due Process Clause to protect pretrial detention. Legislation
like SAMs stand in direct opposition to these decisions and constitutional clauses. To allow them to persist is to open a door through
which citizens’ rights can be infringed upon unscrupulously.
In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, there has
been a heightened awareness on the part of the American people
with regard to ongoing potential terrorist threats. There are those
who would advocate impunity for those who are protecting the United States from other attacks. Such advocates argue that terrorists
ought to be stopped at any cost since nothing could be worse than
losing American lives in a manner like the September 11th attacks.
While it is true that we as a nation ought to do as much as legally
possible to prevent future attacks from occurring, legislation like
SAMs creates the risk that the rights of Americans will be violated.
The case of Syed Hashmi serves as an example. As an American,
12

United States v. Hashmi, F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (2008).
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing
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he is to be considered innocent until proven guilty—something that
cannot be proved if, as has been done thanks to SAMs, there is no
due process for him. In other words, if people like Hashmi are detained indefinitely through extensions provided by SAMs and not
brought to trial, where and when will they be able to defend themselves and their actions? It is understandable to take precautions that
help protect American lives, but it need not happen at the expense of
other American’s liberty.
Article 1 Section 9 of the Constitution states, “The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it14.”
In another case involving a suspected terrorist, Boumedine v. Bush,
instead of using the Due Process Clause, the defense argued that the
Suspension Clause extended to detainees who were noncitizens15.
Even in cases involving noncitizen terrorist suspects, the Suspension
Clause ensures that due process and habeas corpus are respected.
This adds further evidence to suggest that, in the case of Hamdi,
Hashmi, and others like him, detainment for an undefined period
of time is unlawful, as such detainment suspends due process and
limits habeas corpus nearly to the point of nonexistence.

IV. Recommendations
The right of all prisoners to file a writ of habeas corpus needs to
be protected. While current legislation has been written to try and
ensure the maximum protection of the United States against terrorist
attacks, the level to which prisoners’ rights regarding habeas corpus
have been infringed is unacceptable. Prisoners, including American citizens, are given one chance to file a writ of habeas corpus.
Under normal circumstances, a prisoner is able to file multiple writs

14

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

15

Boumedine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).

The Constitutionality of Indefinite Detainment
of United States Citizens as Terrorist Suspects

149

of habeas corpus in order to maximize their chances of release16. If
a detained terror suspect does not obtain release on his first writ of
habeas corpus, he is out of chances. The injustice of this is multiplied
by the ability of the government to detain a terror suspect indefinitely. Because the government can hold a suspect without filing charges
for a year and renew that year indefinitely, theoretically, a suspect
can be held for life without being charged and only one chance for
freedom.
Ideally, a terrorist suspect should be allowed to file multiple
writs of habeas corpus. The limit was originally imposed to prevent
detainees from filing multiple writs frivolously, thus impeding the
justice system. However, restricting filing to one time during an entire incarceration period is overly restrictive. Therefore, a terrorist
suspect should be allowed to file a writ of habeas corpus multiple
times while incarcerated, though removing all restrictions may not
be well advised. The possibility of frivolous writs being filed would
increase with an increase in the limit of writs. Courts have already
taken measures generally to prevent frivolous writs by not requiring the courts to address a writ of habeas corpus if it either does not
present new grounds for relief that were unaddressed in a previous
writ, or if it is clear from the face of the petition that there are no
applicable grounds for relief. Using these same measures for suspected terrorist suspects will help ensure them their Constitutional
right to habeas corpus while preventing frivolous or needless use of
the court system.
Furthermore, a limit needs to be established to the renewal of
years held without charges. Within five years, the government should
be able to provide enough evidence to file charges. If, within that
time period, the government cannot substantiate charges against a
terror suspect, the suspect should be able to obtain release. That way,
even if terrorist suspects are still limited to filing one writ of habeas corpus, they can receive a fair chance at freedom. Although the
16

Multiple writs of habeas corpus are often filed as Constitutional rights
may be violated in different steps of the legal process or as new pieces
of evidence come to light. Normally, a prisoner can file a writ of habeas
corpus at any stage of the judicial process to petition for release, while a
citizen held as a terror suspect is only give one chance.
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process of gathering evidence and forming a case against a suspected
terrorist can be lengthy and difficult, we hold that five years is more
than sufficient time. In highly publicized cases, the process often
takes substantially less time. Recently, as the entire nation watched,
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was arrested and charged, and is currently being
prepared for trial with preliminary measures already underway. This
all took place within a year and a half. Surely, the same can be accomplished for other suspected terrorists in more than three times
the amount of time.
The need to establish a limit to how long suspects can be held
without being charged is further substantiated by the Constitutional
right to a speedy trial. A citizen’s right to face trial under due process of law is clearly violated when a speedy trial is not granted. If a
trial can be indefinitely delayed, the due process is clearly violated.
Furthermore, terrorist suspects are often held under executive orders
or SAMs, and the judicial system is entirely bypassed. This is a clear
violation of the Fifth Amendment, because there is no indictment by
a grand jury for these crimes. SAMs further infringe on Constitutional rights in the restrictions they place on a prisoner’s communication, including with his lawyer, which hampers due process.
(i) Counter-Arguments
The recommendations made herein are, in many ways, a drastic
departure from current legislation. They would close loopholes established in current legislation that allow terror suspects to be held
indefinitely and allows them to file multiple writs of habeas corpus.
Essentially, they allows these suspects to be treated more equally
under the law, just as others suspected of criminal behavior, with
fewer added restrictions. Many people, however, are sensitive to the
loosening of restrictions surrounding terror suspects. Terror suspects people are accused of heinous crimes. The citizens held under
this legislation have betrayed their country and hurt or even killed
their fellow countrymen. In light of the crimes of which these people
stand accused, it may seem right or fulfilling to maintain harsh restrictions.
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However, it is important to remember that the rights and protections that factor in to the criminal justice system were designed to
protect people accused of all types of crimes, even the most extreme.
As difficult as it may be to accept, all citizens deserve their legal protections. The emotion behind the crimes of which these citizens are
accused are strong, but shouldn’t be allowed to influence the legality
of treatment for terror suspects.

V. Conclusion
Combating terrorism is a serious issue in the United States and
will likely continue to grow. As increased numbers of terrorists, both
at home and abroad, are detained and tried for their crimes, the issues
involved will only become bigger and more complex. While current
policies and legislation have lasted this long, their flaws will only be
magnified as the issue they address grows. Left unaddressed, these
problems will become more complex and affect more people. These
issues need to be nipped in the bud, rather than be allowed to grow.
Furthermore, these issues are ultimately a matter of the liberties
and rights guaranteed to American citizens. Regardless of their position before the law, Americans deserve to exercise the full extent of
their rights as outlined in the Constitution. As Benjamin Franklin
said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little
temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” We should
not be willing to sacrifice the liberty of a few for perceived temporary safety. In other words, the Constitutional rights of a few should
not be sacrificed for the many. Furthermore, if the government is
able to begin denying Constitutional rights of some citizens, it sets
a dangerous precedent. Constitutional rights ought to be guaranteed
and not conditionally. In order to preserve the liberty of all citizens,
we need to preserve the liberty of each citizen.
The conditions regarding the detainment of terrorist suspects is a
delicate issue. The importance of the balancing act between protecting national security and guaranteeing citizens their rights cannot be
understated. However, the current situation has tipped the balance
too far away from Constitutional rights, and unnecessarily so. The
benefits gained from such extreme measures are little, especially
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when compared to the gravity of depriving citizens their Constitutional rights. Particularly in terms of habeas corpus, due process,
and other important Constitutional rights, change can be made that
will ensure citizens their rights while still keeping the nation safe
from terrorist attacks.

